

Radio

March 2, 1972

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

50011

disrupted for the lack of a relatively small amount of money.

We must realize that the governments in possession of these currencies may not be happy about committing these funds and some of them may not agree to provide these moneys in time to aid the Peace Corps. We are not undertaking an easy task, but neither is the task of the Peace Corps volunteers easy.

We can act today to continue their important work. Unless we act promptly, Peace Corps volunteers and staff may have to be released in the next few days. Only swift action can give them an 11th hour reprieve. I urge immediate consideration of this legislation.

Because counterpart funds owned by foreign governments may need to be supplemented by those in the possession of the United States, I am also drafting a bill which would authorize the Peace Corps to use such currencies under the emergency circumstances outlined above. I have been in consultation with several of my colleagues, and find there is substantial interest in pursuing this course of action. Mr. President, I assure the Members of this body that I will pursue in every possible way a solution of the crisis faced by the Peace Corps.

The concurrent resolution reads as follows:

S. CON. RES. 66

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the United States should, at the earliest practicable date, enter into negotiations with each government for which currencies of such government have accrued in connection with its purchase of commodities under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480), and which has a Peace Corps contingent present in its country, for the purpose of securing the agreement of that government to make such currencies available to defer all or part of the costs of maintaining such existing Peace Corps contingent within that country through June 30, 1972.*

#### SENATE RESOLUTION 272—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE RELATING TO SUPPORT OF RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, in recent weeks, differences between the House and Senate on the funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have cast in doubt the future of these important radio stations which are the principal sources of free, uncensored, and relatively objective news in the countries of Eastern Europe.

However, a majority of the Members of both Houses are clearly committed to support of these radio stations, as indicated by the fact that both Houses have passed bills to this effect.

Today, in an effort to demonstrate the broad support for continued funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and to assure the 2,533 employees of these radio stations of our appreciation for the valuable work they perform, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) and I are submitting a sense-of-the-Senate resolution which reads as follows:

S. RES. 272

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the continued support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

Whereas Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have provided an important service to the national interest in keeping open channels of information and opinion on matters of vital concern to the peoples of the eastern part of Europe;

Whereas the Senate has appropriately taken the initiative during the past year to establish open and public means of governmental support for these two organizations;

Whereas the Senate and the House of Representatives have both passed bills authorizing support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and American editorial opinion overwhelmingly favors this support;

Whereas the Senate and the House of Representatives have not as yet agreed on the proper means of providing for the future operations of these two organizations; and

Whereas the resulting failure to establish a method of support has brought about a temporary cessation of support causing understandable concern to the personnel of the two radios: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate hereby expresses (1) its continued appreciation of the valuable work being performed by the personnel of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and (2) its intention to provide adequate support to these two radios while the methods for future support are carefully examined within the framework of United States foreign policy objectives.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, already we have been joined in cosponsorship of this resolution by Senators GOLDWATER, STAFFORD, JAVITS, BROCK, GAMBRELL, BUCKLEY, PACKWOOD, DOLE, BAKER, BEALL, BROOKE, COTTON, DOMINICK, GRIFFIN, GURNEY, HANSEN, MILLER, ROTH, TOWER, EASTLAND, PASTORE, BENNETT, MCGEE, RIBICOFF, HRUSKA, SCHWEIKER, BOGGS, COOK, COOPER, FANNIN, FONG, HATFIELD, MATTHIAS, STEVENS, JACKSON, BELLMON, MUSKIE, HART, SCOTT, BENTSEN, WILLIAMS, STEVENSON, MOSS, TAFT, BAYH, MCGOVERN, CURTIS, THURMOND, KENNEDY, MCINTYRE, HOLLINGS, and YOUNG.

I would like to take the occasion of the introduction of this resolution to say that the terms "cold war" and "Iron Curtain" rightly belong to an earlier period, because the processes of East-West negotiation, exchanges and trade have moderated the hostilities of the recent past. Consistent with the atmospheric change in East-West relationships, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have moderated the tone of their broadcasts, and now it can be said that they are dedicated to presenting the news in an objective manner and to presenting commentary without vituperation or heavy handedness.

But whether the terms "cold war" and "Iron Curtain" have any great significance in international relations at this time, they still are valid in respect to the conditions of life for many millions of persons who live in the Soviet Union and in the other countries of Eastern Europe. While a limited number of intellectuals and officials have the opportunity to travel abroad, and have access to Western publications and "White Tass," which reprints topical reports from the foreign press, the vast majority of citizens have access only to that news permitted by the state to be printed or broadcast. Such control of the news media is not imposed for exercise; it is

imposed for its impact on the thinking of the broad masses of people. Apparently even in these times of reduced tensions between East and West, the rulers of the nations of Eastern Europe are not sufficiently self-confident in their power and popularity to allow a free, uncensored presentation of news to be printed and broadcast for public consumption. The astonishing management and control of the media in the Soviet Union, for example, is seen in their media coverage during last week's visit of President Nixon to China. This event, with all its implications for the political future of Asia and its importance to the Soviet Union, received only half as much attention on Soviet radio as did the Greek-Cypriot issue which by any standard was hardly as significant. Moreover, Soviet radio spent twice as much time in adverse comment about China as it did on reportage of the Nixon visit to China.

Pravda devoted seven lines and Radio Moscow devoted 10 seconds to the announcement of President Nixon's arrival in China. Later, Radio Moscow expended its coverage to 22 seconds, but balanced this with 20 seconds of negative reaction to the trip by the American Communist Party. President Nixon's meeting with Mao Tse-tung was accorded 20 seconds by Radio Moscow.

Therefore, I believe it is fair to say that the cold war has not ended for the peoples of Eastern Europe, nor has the Iron Curtain been swept aside. The peoples of Eastern Europe still depend for hard news, for objective news, for total news on radio stations in the West.

BBC and Voice of America do an important job in this regard, but their credibility is affected by the acknowledged fact that they are government-operated. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, while receiving funds from the West, are known to be independent in their operations and presentations. So long as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are needed to inform Eastern Europeans of the news, they should be supported. It is a sad fact that a man in Leningrad may not know of a major news event in Kiev or Prague or Paris or New York unless Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty informs him. For no news, foreign or domestic, is covered by the Soviet media unless it is officially approved for broadcast and print. State information policy is the determining factor in what the people are allowed to know.

An example of the importance of the independent radio stations which broadcast the news into Eastern Europe appeared in John P. Roche's column in the Washington Post of February 26, 1972. Mr. Roche reported the following story:

A Soviet Jew signed a petition attacking the appalling Leningrad trials. Thirty years ago (said Roche) he would have dropped this pebble down a bottomless well, but now, the next morning at 2:30, Radio Liberty was on the air with the text of the petition and the names of the signatories. This man, now in Israel, recalls the sense of triumph as he heard the broadcast: "They (the KGB) can take us now, but our testimony will stand in history."

I am hopeful that the resolution which we submit today will be testimony to the determination of the U.S. Senate to sup-

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port the free flow of information to the countries of Eastern Europe.

**SENATE RESOLUTION 273—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION RELATING TO EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY TO INCLUDE UNDERGROUND TESTING**

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. HART. Mr. President, Senator MATTHIAS and I are today submitting a resolution urging prompt negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. It is our opinion that the United States can now safely change some of the conditions that it has previously insisted on during negotiations and thereby greatly improve chances of success.

An agreement banning nuclear tests has long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy. Since the Senate ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, a comprehensive test ban has been an item on the Agenda at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It has been a subject of great concern to the United Nations and to the governments and peoples throughout the world. Recent advances in seismology now make possible a treaty whose earlier achievement was prevented by the United States-Soviet deadlock over the "on-site inspection" issue.

The most important accomplishment of a comprehensive test ban would be its contribution toward ending the wasteful and awesomely dangerous nuclear arms race. If the two nuclear superpowers finally renounced nuclear testing, it would give substance to the hope that the ever-ascending spiral of nuclear weapons development has come to an end, without the immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were a nuclear war to erupt. Moreover, there are strong indications that the vital Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 may be endangered by the continued United States and Soviet testing. Some of the nations whose signatures are critically important to the stability of the treaty are declining to agree while the superpowers continue the testing which fuels the nuclear race between them.

We must bear in mind, too, the danger that continued weapons development will almost inevitably lead some day to the discovery of the "cheap A-bomb" that will put atomic weaponry within pocket-book range of dozens of nations. It does not take much imagination to visualize what that would do to world stability.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere. It was hoped that this measure would slow down the arms race, eliminate the most dangerous hazards to the environment and save vast sums that might be used for more constructive purposes. The past 10 years have proved that this has not been the case.

The United States has spent almost \$3 billion on underground tests since 1963 without achieving any greater degree of national security. While the Limited Test Ban Treaty drastically reduced the annual global deposit of radioactive

fallout from nuclear tests, it did not, as has been hoped, limit the development of nuclear weapons nor the rate of testing. On the contrary, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute—SIPRI—while the annual average number of all tests by all nuclear powers before the 1963 treaty was 40, by 1970 it was 48 and increasing annually. According to SIPRI, the United States has been in the lead, staging 188 underground weapons tests between October 1963 and July 1970; 64 were recorded for the U.S.S.R.

As an aside, I might note that our Government has officially announced far fewer tests than are attributed to us by SIPRI. Likewise, our Government's estimates of the number of Soviet underground tests is lower than SIPRI's.

We must remember that both the United States and the Soviet Union have good reason for fogging up the number of tests they know about.

Let me quote from the SIPRI report of October 1971:

If the United States announced all the Soviet tests it detected by seismic and other secret means, it would indicate to the Soviet Union and other countries the yield below which it was possible to avoid detection.

And if the United States were to announce all its own tests, this would permit the Soviet Union to claim they had detected them all and hence that verification was no problem.

Consequently, all governmental estimates of the numbers of tests must be greeted skeptically.

SIPRI reports that about 20 of the U.S. explosions vented radiation. Clearly, this contamination affects the atmosphere. Up to now, there has been no thorough evaluation of whether contamination can also poison underground waters.

In addition to the radiation dangers, large underground tests present a threat of earthquakes and tidal waves. A special presidential panel investigating the safety of U.S. underground tests noted that tests detonated in areas of earthquake activity have resulted in many small tremors. This panel, which reported in 1968, has headed by Dr. Kenneth Kitzer, president of Stanford University and former Research Director of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The panel concluded that there is a risk of damaging earthquakes resulting from nuclear tests of over 1 megaton.

The overriding reason for banning nuclear tests, however, is that continued testing does not add to our national security, but, in fact, reduces it. The longer the arms race continues, the greater the risk of a nuclear holocaust.

Moreover, the doubtfulness of the contention that the United States must continue to test to stay even with the Soviets can be clearly demonstrated by the following figures: it is estimated that the United States possesses approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads fitted with delivery vehicles that could reach the U.S.S.R., and that the Soviets have 2,000 warheads which could strike at the United States. In our country there are 150 population centers with more than 100,000 residents, and in the U.S.S.R.

there are 175 such centers. With present nuclear weapons the United States could destroy the Soviet centers 34 times over, and the Soviets could annihilate the U.S. cities 13 times. This overkill capacity eliminates any justification for further development of offensive nuclear weapons and for the underground test programs which fuel the race.

We must also recognize that an agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is necessary if there is to be an end to the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations, which is the great promise of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It should be recalled that the Senate expressed its nearly unanimous approbation for this treaty. It seems clear that the importance of bringing all nations into that treaty increases daily, yet some of the most important nations are withholding signatures because of the continued United States-Soviet testing activities.

Mr. President, the United States is bound by two treaties to work toward the comprehensive test ban agreement. The preamble of the Limited Test Ban Treaty—1963—states that the parties will seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and will "continue negotiations to this end, and that they desire to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances." The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ratified in 1968, repeats this commitment and states:

Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date . . .

The nonnuclear and near-nuclear powers refused to support the Nonproliferation Treaty unless this provision was included. From the introduction of their first Joint Memorandum, in 1965, the nonnuclear powers insisted that the treaty "must be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race." Consistently, they have given priority to the comprehensive test ban as the one measure which could most successfully signify that the Nonproliferation Treaty is not an instrument of discrimination by the superpowers. Unless we soon conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty, thereby assuring the world that we are ready to renounce further nuclear weapons development, there is likelihood of a proliferation of nuclear powers in the near future—not just Japan, India, and Israel, which are often mentioned, but also other more politically instable nations.

The principal obstacle to a comprehensive test ban over the years has been the United States' insistence on effective verification measures through on-site inspection, a condition apparently still unacceptable to the Soviets—although at one point in 1962 the Soviets and the United States were close to agreement on a limited number of annual on-site inspections. Today there is substantial scientific evidence that on-site inspection is no longer necessary for effective enforcement of a treaty. Leading scientists have stated in the SIPRI report, and in